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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”)
communities presents an important lens through which to view the issues of do-
mestic and intimate partner violence1 and the legal definition, and recognition, of
LGBT relationships.2  While domestic violence occurs at the same rate in LGBT
intimate partnerships as in heterosexual partnerships,3 this violence is not ad-
dressed by many civil legal remedies available to heterosexual partners who are
married or who have children together.  This is, in large part, due to the legal
definition of an intimate partnership, which, in New York State, requires that
the parties be members of the “same family or household.”4  This phrase excludes
many LGBT survivors of domestic violence from civil legal remedies.  The re-
maining criminal legal remedies may be, for reasons discussed below, unappeal-
ing to LGBT survivors of domestic violence.  The intersection of violence in the
LGBT communities and the civil legal remedies available to LGBT survivors
rests primarily on the legal recognition, or lack thereof, of LGBT relationships.
This article explores that intersection.
New York State provides civil legal protections to victims of domestic vio-
lence primarily through the Family Court Act, which governs family court mat-
ters including family offenses (New York State’s definition of domestic violence),5
1. Although many LGBT survivors of violence characterize the violence as “intimate partner” violence
rather than “domestic” violence for many reasons, including the possible lack of a domestic or cohabiting
relationship, for the ease of this article and because most laws refer to this violence as “domestic,” I will use
the phrase “domestic violence” to mean violence between intimate partners regardless of the lawful recog-
nition or personal definition of the relationship or the status of cohabitation.
2. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (also referred to as “trans”) communities can also be referred to as
the “queer” community and include people who identify as queer, questioning, two-spirited, gender vari-
ant, genderqueer, bigendered, intergender, intersex, same gender loving, or by any other terms that indi-
cate self-definition of gender identity or sexual orientation. See  Eli Green & Eric N. Peterson,
LGBTTSQI Terminology (2006), http://www.trans-academics.org/lgbttsqiterminology.pdf.  The lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender communities are not interchangeable.  For practitioners new to the issues of
the LGBT communities, some of the language used to describe LGBT people and their partners or their
identities can be confusing.  Gender identity is often confused with sexual orientation.  Sexual orientation
is commonly defined as our preference for sexual partners—either same-sex or opposite-sex partners.  Les-
bians generally identify themselves as women who partner with other women.  Gay men generally iden-
tify themselves as men who partner with other men.  Bisexual people often identify themselves as people
who partner with same-sex and opposite-sex partners.  On the other hand, gender identity is commonly
defined as a sense of ourselves as masculine, feminine, or at some other point along that spectrum.  Trans-
gender people may define themselves as male or female, or in a differently defined gender or lack of
gender.  While some transgender people do identify as queer (either because they are involved in same-sex
relationships or because their sexual orientation is not “straight”), others define their sexual orientation as
straight or heterosexual.
3. DIANE R. DOLAN-SOTO & SARA KAPLAN, A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT (AVP) 3 (2003/2004 ed., The New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence
Project 2005), available at http://www.avp.org/ (follow “publications” hyperlink; then follow “AVP Re-
ports” hyperlink; then follow “2003-2004 New York City Domestic Violence Report” hyperlink).
4. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney 2007).
5. See generally id. at art. 8.
248
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
custody and visitation,6 and support,7 and the Domestic Relations Law, which
governs New York Supreme Court proceedings when the court is hearing matri-
monial matters.8  To invoke these protections, parties must meet the criteria of a
statutorily defined legal relationship that is generally set forth in the Family
Court Act or the Domestic Relations Law.9  The Domestic Relations Law re-
quires that parties be legally married.10  The Family Court Act allows petitions
to be made by “members of the same family or household,” defined as “(a) persons
related by consanguinity or affinity; (b) persons legally married to one another; (c)
persons formerly married to one another; and (d) persons who have a child in
common regardless whether such persons have been married or have lived to-
gether at any time.”11  For the most part, lesbians and gay men, bisexual people
in same-sex relationships, and transgender people whose gender identity may
vary from their legal identity, cannot meet these criteria.12  While legal recogni-
tion of LGBT relationships is expanding,13 domestic violence in the LGBT com-
munities is not adequately addressed by current laws.14  Many traditional legal
remedies that address domestic violence assume that intimate partners are hetero-
6. See generally id. at art. 6.
7. See generally id. at art. 4.
8. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW art. 13 (McKinney 2007).
9. See  Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 588–89 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2005), rev’d 805 N.Y.S.2d
354 (1st Dep’t 2005), aff’d 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006) (citing an informal opinion of the attorney general of the
state of New York stating that “although the DRL does not expressly bar marriage of same-sex couples,
. . . both the inclusion of gender-specific terms in multiple sections of the DRL, and the historical context
in which the DRL was enacted, indicate that the Legislature did not intend to authorize same-sex
marriage”).
10. The question of what constitutes a legal marriage remains unanswered in New York State.  It is unclear
whether a marriage recognized as legal in another state or country will be recognized in New York State.
See  Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2006).  This issue is beyond the scope of
this article.
11. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)–(d).
12. The exception may be parents of a legally adopted child; however, to date, no published decision discusses
this relationship in the context of domestic violence. See id.  By the same token, opposite-sex couples who
do not have children in common and who choose not to marry may be similarly barred.  This article focuses
on the effects of domestic and intimate partner violence on people in LGBT relationships as there are
attendant and influential concerns related to homophobia or transphobia experienced by LGBT litigants
invoking legal remedies.
13. See generally Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on
Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (discussing the legitimacy
of relationships as recognized by United States courts).
14. See  Sharon Cammack & Patrice Pujol, Domestic Violence: A National Epidemic, HOUS. LAW.,
Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 10 (“But all too often, gay or lesbian victims receive fewer legal and societal protec-
tions.  In fact, several states reportedly define domestic violence to specifically exclude same-sex victims.”).
New York is cited as one of these states.  In New York, some heterosexual survivors of domestic violence
are excluded from the same domestic violence protections unavailable to LGBT survivors.  While this
article focuses on issues specific to the LGBT communities, many of the same obstacles are faced by hetero-
sexual survivors who are not married to, or who do not have children in common with, their partners.
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sexual, omit reference to LGBT victims, and fail to account for the impact of
sexual orientation or gender identity.15
This article explores intimate partner violence in the LGBT communities
and the legal remedies that address it.  Section II explores the legal recognition of
LGBT relationships afforded by New York State, and domestic violence in the
LGBT communities.  Section III surveys remedies available to LGBT survivors,
primarily in same-sex relationships, and concludes that the lack of legal recogni-
tion of LGBT relationships hinders LGBT survivors from protecting themselves
from domestic violence and its effects.  Section IV explores the impact of frag-
mented relief on LGBT survivors of domestic violence and examines legislation
that may address this piecemeal approach.  The article concludes with recommen-
dations for holistic legislation that will better protect LGBT survivors.
II. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT RELATIONSHIPS AND LGBT DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
A. Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships in New York State
While same-sex battering in many ways mirrors heterosexual battering,
both in type and in prevalence, victims of same-sex battering receive fewer pro-
tections.  Despite some legislative advances, many laws fail to recognize a legal
relationship between same-sex intimate partners.  The recognition that a court or
statute gives to a relationship largely defines the remedies available to the parties
in that relationship.  For bisexual and transgender people involved with someone
of the opposite sex,16 the relationship may be viewed as a traditional opposite-sex
relationship for the purposes of marriage licenses, domestic partnerships, or other
legal relationships as defined in the Family Court Act or the Domestic Relations
Law.17
For lesbians, gay men, and bisexual and transgender people involved in
same-sex relationships, the process of determining whether the relationships are
legally recognized is more difficult.  New York State law does not currently pro-
15. This omission of identity from the statute, and the impact of identity on services provided to domestic
violence survivors, has been explored in relation to race and ethnic identity. See  Adele M. Morrison,
Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving From White Victim to Multi-Cultural
Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061 (2006).
16. Although I have found no case law on point, from speaking to transgender activists and attorneys, it
appears that for the purposes of the Family Court Act or the Domestic Relations Law, courts will likely
define a relationship as heterosexual if the partner’s sex is the opposite of the trans client’s sex as recorded
on official documents.  For example, a male to female trans woman would identify as a woman, but if her
driver’s license still reflects “male” as her sex, courts will likely, for the purpose of granting a marriage
license, define her as “male.”
17. See  B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (“While it is possible that defendant
may function as a male in other situations and in other relationships, defendant cannot function as a
husband by assuming male duties and obligations inherent in the marriage relationship. . . . Apparently,
hormone treatments and surgery have not succeeded in supplying the necessary apparatus to enable defen-
dant to function as a man for purposes of procreation.”).
250
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-2\NLR201.txt unknown Seq: 7  7-FEB-08 9:30
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
vide its citizens in same-sex relationships with access to legal marriage, civil
unions, domestic partnerships, or other methods for recognizing and legitimizing
their relationships.18  Only a limited number of jurisdictions throughout the state
offer formalized domestic partnership registries that are inclusive of same-sex
relationships.19  Without clear legislative direction, civil courts throughout the
state have been left to dissect, categorize, and formalize the relationships of the
litigants before them in a variety of civil contexts such as settlement of estates,
access to employment-related benefits, access to marriage, dissolution of relation-
ships, distribution of jointly held property, and tort actions.  Not surprisingly, the
body of New York civil law varies from court to court and county to county.  The
state has largely refused to accord legal recognition to same-sex relationships
when asserted to be spouse-like relationships.
Over the last two decades, courts have struggled with how to define, and
therefore what benefits to accord, same-sex relationships.  In 1989, the New York
Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, recognized that same-sex partners may
qualify as “family members” under rent control law,20 and then later, the First
and Second Departments of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court ex-
tended this protection to rent stabilization law.21  In 1990, the Court of Appeals
declined to review the surrogate court’s refusal to recognize unmarried same-sex
couples for the purposes of estates and trusts laws.22  In 1999, there was some
movement toward recognition when the First Department, although holding
that same-sex partners living together in a spouse-like relationship did not enjoy
a legally recognized relationship for the purposes of insurance law, suggested in
dicta that a same-sex partner might qualify as a “spouse” in some contexts.23  In
2005, the Third Department refused to recognize a same-sex partner as a “sur-
viving spouse” for the purpose of seeking death benefits.24  Just a few months
later, the Supreme Court of New York in Westchester County held that registered
domestic partnership status does not give rise to standing for a loss of consortium
claim because lawful marriage is required.25  In May of 2006, the Court of Ap-
18. See Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338.
19. See , e.g. , N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241 (2007); WESTCHESTER CITY CODE ch. 550 (2007); ITHACA
CITY CODE pt. II, ch. 215, §§ 215.19–215.27 (2007); ALBANY CITY CODE ch. 215, §§ 12–14 (2007).
20. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989).
21. E. 10th St. Assocs. v. Estate of Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1st Dep’t 1990); LaMarche v. Miles, 234
N.Y.L.J. 19 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 2005).
22. In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1990), aff’d, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (2d Dep’t 1993),
appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 801 (1993) (finding that partners in unmarried same-sex relationships
cannot be considered “surviving spouses” under the estates and trusts laws).
23. Ortiz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 699 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep’t 1999).
24. Valentine v. Am. Airlines, 791 N.Y.S.2d 217 (3d Dep’t 2005).
25. Lennon v. Charney, 797 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2005) (holding that a derivative loss
of consortium claim could not be maintained based on the claimant’s status as a registered domestic partner
in New York City because lawful marriage is required).
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peals again declined to review a matter in which the Second Department held
that a surviving partner of a same-sex Vermont civil union was not a “surviving
spouse” for estates and trusts purposes.26  Shortly thereafter, in August of 2006,
the Supreme Court in Nassau County held that a same-sex partner has standing
to bring a wrongful death action and a personal injury claim on behalf of the
statutory distributees as the executor of the decedent’s estate.27  The court rea-
soned that the partner in this action did not have to be defined as a spouse be-
cause she had standing as an executor.28
This case law suggests that the trial courts in at least some counties, and the
appellate courts in others, are attempting to carve out ways to recognize the exis-
tence of same-sex relationships without affording these relationships the same
benefits afforded to opposite-sex marriages.  However, in July of 2006, this issue
was directly addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Hernandez v. Ro-
bles , when the court held that same-sex couples were not entitled to marry in
New York under the current law, given the statutory language of the Domestic
Relations Law.29  The court reasoned that such an interpretation of the law was
not an unconstitutional violation of equal protection, and called upon the legisla-
ture to determine whether to provide such access to legal marriage.30  Within
days, the New York Supreme Court in Nassau County, relying on Hernandez,
declined to recognize a Canadian same-sex marriage for the purpose of health
insurance coverage for a same-sex spouse.31  Subsequently, in Gonzalez v.
Green , the trial court refused to recognize a marriage performed in Massachu-
setts, and instead found it void under the laws of both New York (because the
union was between two men and not one man and one woman) and Massachu-
setts (because residency, which the parties conceded they did not have, was re-
quired by Massachusetts law).32  The court in Gonzalez did not reach the issue
of whether New York will recognize an out-of-state same-sex marriage if it is
valid under the laws of the marrying state.33
In 2001 and 2002, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center, the governor and the New York State Legislature provided
26. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep’t 2005), appeal dismissed, 6 N.Y.3d
890 (2006) (finding that a surviving partner of a same-sex Vermont civil union could not bring a wrong-
ful death action arising from his partner’s death).
27. Saegert v. Simonelli, 824 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006).
28. Id.
29. 7 N.Y.3d at 356.
30. Id. at 356–66.
31. Funderburke v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Civil Serv., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006)
(finding that a retired teacher was not entitled to health insurance coverage for his spouse because the
Canadian same-sex marriage was not between a man and a woman).
32. Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2006).
33. Id.
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some direction to the courts in considering same-sex relationships.  This legisla-
tion defined same-sex surviving partners as “surviving spouses” for the purposes
of receiving benefits from the Crime Victims Board,34 the September 11 Federal
Fund awards,35 workers’ compensation death benefits,36 and the state’s World
Trade Center Memorial Scholarship program.37  In 2003, the state extended to
same-sex partners of credit union members the right to become members and
have full access to banking services.38  In 2004, the governor and the New York
State Legislature passed a bill that provides domestic partners with the right of
visitation accorded to spouses and next-of-kin at any hospital, nursing home, or
health care facility.39
When addressing relationships that fall short of spousal relationships, such as
domestic partnerships, same-sex relationships fare slightly better in New York
than in other states.  Domestic partnerships, including same-sex domestic part-
nerships, are recognized by a few localities,40 but they do not confer the state and
federal protections or privileges of marriage, and they do not give partners direct
access to traditional legal protection from domestic violence.41  For example, the
rights conferred by New York City upon a domestic partnership include (1) be-
reavement leave and childcare for New York City employees, (2) visitation in
correctional and juvenile detention centers, (3) visitation in facilities operated by
the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, (4) eligibility to qualify as
a family member to be added by the New York City Housing Authority to an
existing tenancy as a permanent resident, (5) eligibility to qualify as a family
member entitled to succeed a tenant or cooperator in the tenancy or occupancy of a
building supervised by the Department of Housing Preservation and Develop-
ment, and (6) health benefits provided by New York City to its employees and
retirees and eligible members of their families pursuant to stipulation or collective
bargaining.42  In February 2006, the governor signed the Control of Remains
bill that extends control over a partner’s corpse to the domestic partner, both
same- and opposite-sex.43  However, as family courts are courts of limited juris-
34. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.113.30 (2001).
35. Workers’ Compensation, Estates, Powers and Trusts, Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act—“September 11th
Victims and Families Relief Act,” 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws 358 (McKinney).
36. Workers’ Comp.—Domestic Partners—Death Benefits, 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1237 (McKinney).
37. Education—World Trade Center Membership Scholarships, 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws 849 (McKinney).
38. Banks and Bank—Credit Unions—Requirements, 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1393 (McKinney).
39. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-q (2007).
40. See , e.g. , N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-241 (2006); WESTCHESTER CITY CODE ch. 550 (2007); ITHACA
CITY CODE pt. II, ch. 215, §§ 215.19–215.27 (2007); ALBANY CITY CODE ch. 215, §§ 12–14 (2007).
41. When recognized, domestic partnerships do confer some privileges and a legal status to same-sex couples
who are so partnered.
42. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-244 (2006).
43. Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, Governor Signs Control of Remains Bill (Feb. 3, 2006),
available at http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/2006/pr-02-03-06.htm. The bill provides for
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diction in New York, only those specifically enumerated classes of individuals
defined as family or household members may be granted access to the protections
outlined in the Family Court Act.44  A “domestic partner” does not qualify for
family or household membership status under the Family Court Act and, to date,
there have been no legal challenges or efforts in family courts to obtain such status
for this class of persons.  In addition, a domestic partner does not qualify as a
“spouse” under the Domestic Relations Law.45
Over the past few years, the courts and the legislature have struggled to
define same-sex partnerships with varying results.  There are no statutes or case
law that specifically address the intersection of domestic violence and the LGBT
communities in New York.  One concept that becomes clear when examining the
conclusions of different judges and legislators throughout the state, however, is
that the protections created for “victims of domestic violence” exclude LGBT
survivors.
B. Defining Domestic Violence
For the LGBT communities fighting for equality and the legitimization of
their relationships, it is difficult to admit that battering occurs (for fear of por-
traying LGBT relationships as violent), while simultaneously seeking legal and
societal approval for these relationships.  However, domestic, or intimate part-
ner, violence occurs within the LGBT communities46 with the same statistical
frequency as in the heterosexual community.47  The prevalence of domestic vio-
lence among gay and lesbian couples is approximately 25 to 33 percent.48  Each
year between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand lesbians and as many as
five hundred thousand gay men are battered.49  Although few studies have been
equal standing for spouses and domestic partners above blood relationships like adult children, parents,
and adult siblings. Id.
44. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1).
45. See  Funderburke v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Civil Serv., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006)
(holding that a Canadian same-sex marriage would not be recognized as a marriage in New York State
because it was not between a man and a woman).
46. See  Panelists of the Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual Domestic Violence Conference,
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Violence, 29 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 121 (2001).
47. DOLAN-SOTO & KAPLAN, supra note 3; see also Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in
Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 287 (2006) (suggesting that while domestic violence
may occur at the same statistical frequency in both same- and opposite-sex relationships, it may be milder
in same-sex relationships than in opposite-sex relationships).
48. DOLAN-SOTO & KAPLAN, supra note 3.
49. Nancy E. Murphy, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 340 (1995).
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done, preliminary data suggests that domestic violence may occur at a higher rate
in transgender relationships.50
As in the heterosexual community, domestic violence in the LGBT commu-
nities is generally defined as a pattern of behavior in which one partner coerces,
dominates, or isolates the other partner.51  It is the exertion of any form of power
that is used to maintain control in a relationship.  The violence can be physical,
emotional, sexual, psychological, or economic.  Same-sex batterers use tactics of
abuse similar to those of heterosexual batterers.  However, some forms of bat-
tering are unique to the LGBT communities.  Batterers in same-sex relationships
have an additional social weapon in their arsenal.  Same-sex batterers are able to
successfully exploit their victims’ internalized, or the community’s externalized,
homophobia, biphobia, or transphobia, simply by threatening to “out” their part-
ners’ sexual orientation or gender identity to family, friends, employers, land-
lords, or other community members.52  As further explained by the New York
City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project:
[LGBT] abusers have some additional tools at their disposal;
heterosexism, homophobia, transphobia and biphobia.  Heterosexism
refers to the presumption that heterosexual relationships are the ‘right,’
only or preferred form of relationship.  Homo/trans/bi-phobias refer to
fear, ignorance and hatred of [LGBT] persons.  Heterosexism, as well
as the other phobias, can be exhibited or used by people of any sexual
orientation or gender identity.  [LGBT] abusers use these biases and
stigmas to convince their victims that no one else will care about them,
and that if victims seek assistance from others, they may be at risk for
bias or even abuse, unfortunately not an unfounded concern.
[LGBT] abusers may also use these biases within relationships to
control their victims’ forms of self-expression or social contact with
others.53
Same-sex survivors of domestic violence faced with custody battles worry that
their sexual orientation will negatively impact their cases, and decide to stay
with their abusers rather than risk losing custody or visitation rights.  Batterers
who abuse their transgender partners often tell their partners that no one will
50. See  Survivor Project, http://www.survivorproject.org/survivor.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).  This
may be due to societal transphobic responses to transgender people.  Arlene Istar Lev & S. Sundance Lev,
Sexual Assault in the Transgender Communities, F.O.R.G.E., Oct. 15, 1999, at 7, available at http://
my.execpc.com/~dmmunson/Nov99_7.htm.
51. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, What Counts As Domestic Violence? A Conceptual Analysis, 12
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 301 (2006).
52. Michelle Aulivola, Outing Domestic Violence, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 162, 164 (2004) (“Abusers in gay and
lesbian relationships often threaten ‘outing,’ or divulging a partner’s sexual orientation to family, friends,
employers, or the community in general in an attempt to keep the victim from reporting the acts of
violence and to force them to remain in the abusive relationship.”).
53. DOLAN-SOTO & KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 3–4.
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understand or love them because of their gender identity or transition process; or
they may threaten to evict their transgender partners, leaving the survivors
homeless and facing dangers on the streets, in homeless shelters, and in a discrim-
inatory job market.  Survivors face further isolation because they are reluctant to
access services that are not perceived as LGBT-friendly.  For LGBT survivors,
their batterers are often the first or the only persons to accept their sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity, and batterers use this knowledge to keep survivors
isolated.54
III. LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO LGBT SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN NEW YORK STATE
A. Addressing LGBT Domestic Violence
Legal, social, and academic responses to domestic violence in the LGBT com-
munities are largely acknowledged to be inadequate.  Theories for this inade-
quacy include homophobia within the legal system,55 lack of knowledge of
agencies and organizations that would otherwise respond to the violence,56 the
reluctance of LGBT community members to discuss domestic violence,57 and the
lack of attention the issue has received from LGBT rights and anti-domestic vio-
lence advocates.58
LGBT survivors cannot access the commonly used legal protection of civil
orders of protection, however, because they lack standing under the Family Court
Act.59  Although bisexual and transgender individuals who marry opposite-sex
partners and same-sex partners who adopt children in common may be able to
use this remedy,60 the definition of family prevents the majority of LGBT people
54. See  Aulivola, supra note 52; Leti Volpp, On Culture, Difference, and Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 393 (2003).
55. See  Krisana M. Hodges, Trouble in Paradise: Barriers to Addressing Domestic Violence in Lesbian
Relationships, 9 L. & SEXUALITY 311, 331 (1999–2000) (“The obstacles lesbian battered women cur-
rently face—homophobia, discrimination, and statutory exclusion—are institutionally entrenched.  In-
cluding the experiences of victims of same-sex domestic violence in the legal and political efforts to
strengthen domestic violence laws is not enough to move mountains of legal oppression; however, statutory
changes may combine with increased theoretical awareness to provide real and more complete legal protec-
tion for these victims.”).
56. See  Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse that Dare Not Speak its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay
Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993).
57. See  Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn’t Anyone Talk About Gay and Lesbian Domestic Vio-
lence? , 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23 (1996).
58. See  Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While Risking
Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325 (1999).
59. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 812(1), 821.  Bills that would expand the definition of “family” for purposes
of the Family Court Act to allow LGBT people (among other unrelated persons in intimate or dating
relationships) access to the family courts have been proposed in the New York State Legislature since 1988.
60. It is well established that same-sex couples in New York may adopt children in common, and that applica-
tions for adoption may not be denied on the basis of the applicant’s sexual orientation. N.Y. COMP.
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in long-term, committed relationships, most of whom are not married and do not
have children in common,61 from obtaining this relief in family courts.62
Advocates have asserted that domestic violence must be addressed by a holis-
tic, multi-tiered approach.63  First, domestic violence survivors and their chil-
dren must be safe from imminent harm.64  This is often accomplished through
court orders that protect the survivor and his or her children, and provide for
limited contact with the abuser when custody, visitation, or housing issues are
implicated.65  Second, survivors must be free to live autonomously from the abus-
ers.66  These needs are farther reaching and take more time to address, as they
invoke long-term decisions about children as well as housing and economic is-
sues.67  New York laws address these issues through an overlapping system of
family laws and matrimonial laws for heterosexual partners who are married or
who have children.68  These provisions, as discussed in detail below, at times
protect LGBT survivors and at times do not.  Much domestic-violence-related
relief, such as the legal dissolution of a relationship, resolution of custody, visita-
tion and support issues, and distribution of joint property, is available to married
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h) (2007); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 622 N.Y.S.2d 160 (4th
Dep’t 1994).  A same-sex partner of a child’s biological mother may adopt the child regardless of the
partner’s sexual orientation. In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995).  The partners of a same-sex couple may
adopt jointly by what is known as a two-parent adoption. In re the Adoption of Carolyn B., 774
N.Y.S.2d 227 (4th Dep’t 2004).  This adoption of a child confers upon the two parents a legally recognized
relationship. See id.  New York also permits gay men and lesbians to become foster parents. See In re
the Adoption of Jessica N., 609 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1st Dep’t 1994).  Adoptions by same-sex couples, when
challenged by one partner after a break up, will not lightly be set aside. See  Turner v. Hembrooke, 785
N.Y.S.2d 772 (3d Dep’t 2004).
61. Also excluded from this definition are opposite-sex couples who choose not to get married and do not have
children in common, and teenagers who are too young to marry and do not have children in common,
among other groups.
62. Although New York does not allow most LGBT people to use the family or supreme courts to obtain orders
of protection, the New York City Criminal Court has held that New York courts must give full faith and
credit to orders of protection from other states, even if they are issued to same-sex couples who would not
be entitled to the same relief in New York.  People v. Hadley, 658 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Crim. Ct. Richmond
County 1997).
63. See, e.g., Lowell D. Castleton et al., ADA County Family Violence Court: Shaping the Means to
Better the Result, 39 FAM. L.Q. 27, 51 (2005).
64. See Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical
Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 835 (2001).
65. See  Anne C. Johnson, From House to Home: Creating a Right to Early Lease Termination for
Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859 (2006).
66. See  Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty
Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1995).
67. See  Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000).
68. See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT arts. 4, 6 & 8 (2007).
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survivors under the Domestic Relations Law.  However, most LGBT survivors
do not have standing to invoke this relief.69
B. Domestic Violence Remedies for LGBT Survivors
New York judicial and legislative efforts have created some specific legal
rights for same-sex couples, but few of these rights are protections from domestic
violence.  For example, one significant remedy is compensation from the Crime
Victims Board, which was recently extended to all domestic partners, including
same-sex partners.70
Many groups have long recognized the insufficient response to domestic vio-
lence for LGBT citizens.  In its periodic reports to the governor, the Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence, which evaluates mandatory arrest laws and
other practices in New York, has noted that an expansion of the definition of
family and household member to include these families is necessary.71  In its re-
port to the Chief Judge in 2005, the New York State Matrimonial Commission
recognized the difficulty of applying current domestic violence remedies to LGBT
relationships, and recommended that remedies be expanded.72  As discussed in
detail in Section IV of this article, remedial legislation has been pending since
1988; however, for nearly twenty years, the New York Senate has refused to
move the bill out of committee and onto the senate floor for a vote.
Although same-sex couples without children in common are ineligible for
civil orders of protection, criminal court orders are available.73  The Criminal
Procedure Law provides for protections for survivors of family offenses, similar
to civil orders of protection, when the parties have a relationship of “family” as
69. It is unlikely that LGBT partners will receive legal recognition of their relationships through marriage or
a marriage-like union.  The New York Court of Appeals, in 2006, determined that the lack of access to
marriage did not violate the rights of same-sex couples in New York State.  Hernandez v. Robles, 7
N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
70. This protection is not limited to victims of September 11th, but extends to all crime victims. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 §§ 525.1, 525.2 (2007).
71. SUZANNE CECALA & MARY M. WALSH, N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, NEW YORK STATE’S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SYSTEMS AND SERVICES MAKING
A DIFFERENCE (2006), available at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/about_dv/nyresponse/nysdv.pdf.
72. SONDRA MILLER, MATRIMONIAL COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/matrimonialcommissionreport.pdf.  Al-
though the New York State Assembly has proposed and passed legislation that would expand the Family
Court Act to include unmarried couples without children in common, the measure has never passed the
Senate. Id.
73. Under the expanded New York City Police Department definition, a family or household includes persons
who are not legally married, but are currently living together in a family-type relationship; persons who
are not legally married, but formerly lived together in a family-type relationship; and persons who are
registered New York City domestic partners.  The content of the order of protection obtained in criminal
court will vary depending upon whether the parties meet the definition of “family” under the Family
Court Act. See CECALA & WALSH, supra note 71 at 7.
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defined by the Family Court Act.74  These provisions include orders to stay away,
orders to refrain from committing family offenses, visitation terms, protection for
children and family and household members, permission to enter a residence to
remove personal belongings, and any other terms the court finds necessary to
protect the complainant.75  In contrast, the Criminal Procedure Law section that
applies to crimes other than family offenses grants criminal courts the power to
issue only orders to stay away and refrain from harassment, intimidation,
threats, or other interference with the proceeding.76  New York has a mandatory
arrest law77 that requires that a police arrest be made under delineated circum-
stances,78 and requires that a primary aggressor determination be made when
there is a contemplation of mutual arrests for misdemeanors.79  LGBT victims of
domestic violence are protected by the mandatory arrest law only if the police
respond to an abusive incident as a domestic incident committed by a family or
household member.80  An appellate court has ruled that a domestic incident report
should be filled out even when the parties are not family or household members
within the meaning of the Family Court Act.81  This protection is often unpre-
dictable as police department practices vary throughout the state.82  Additionally,
the police often do not perceive incidents of domestic, or intimate partner, vio-
lence as such between same-sex couples, and instead assume that the dispute is a
discrete argument.  Even if the police acknowledge and understand the intimate
nature of the relationship between the parties, the officers often fall victims to
stereotypes that interfere with the proper implementation of the mandatory ar-
rest law.  For example, an officer may assume that the primary aggressor is the
more masculine-identified partner, or that an incident of domestic violence be-
tween gay male partners does not require police intervention because, as men,
each partner can handle himself.
74. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)–(d).
75. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12.
76. Id. § 530.13.
77. While a discussion of mandatory arrest laws is generally beyond the scope of this article, it is important to
note that mandatory arrests are not uniformly viewed as an appropriate response to domestic or intimate
partner violence. See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An
Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231
(1994).
78. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4).  New York State law requires that an arrest be made if the police
have reasonable cause to believe that certain felonies have been committed by “family and household
members,” or that the respondent or defendant has been duly served with an order of protection and has
violated the order, or that specified misdemeanors have occurred and the complainant does not affirma-
tively, and without being questioned by the police, ask for the police not to arrest. Id.
79. Id. § 140.10(4)(c).
80. Id. § 140.10.
81. Groves v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 707 N.Y.S.2d 261 (3d Dep’t 2000).
82. See CECALA & WALSH, supra note 71.
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Although the criminal justice system is available to LGBT survivors, LGBT
survivors view this system with trepidation.83  Many survivors of domestic vio-
lence have themselves had past homophobic or transphobic interactions with the
police and do not view law enforcement as available to the LGBT communities.
Survivors who would otherwise call the police are often afraid to do so because of
a fear of what the police will do to their partners once the partners are in custody.
LGBT community members have a sense of how the police have reacted, or failed
to react, to LGBT hate and bias crimes, and wonder if the police department is a
safe place to seek help.  In addition, criminal court orders of protection require a
higher burden of proof than family court orders, which makes proving lower
level domestic violence allegations beyond a reasonable doubt more difficult, as
these crimes are often verbal threats that were witnessed only by the victim.
Criminal court orders, particularly those not recognizing the intimate nature of
the relationship, also fail to provide the protection that a civil court order of
protection would.84  Although available, same-sex litigants are often fearful of
invoking these judicial protections as they report a perceived bias in the New
York court system and a fear that judges are not properly educated, and that
district attorneys’ offices do not comprehensively understand issues particular to
LGBT survivors.85
C. Custody and Visitation Protections
When there is a legal relationship between a child and both same-sex part-
ners or opposite-sex bisexual or transgender partners, whether through adoption,
marriage, or an order of filiation, courts look to the “best interests of the child,” in
determining custody and visitation matters.86  The Domestic Relations Law re-
quires a court to consider the effect of domestic violence on the child in determin-
ing custody or visitation, which applies to LGBT custody determinations.87  If
there is no legal relationship between the child and one of the partners, courts
83. See  Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law: What
Might Happen when Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional Responses to
Domestic Violence , 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 94 (2003) (“As with those who identify
as belonging to other subordinated communities, LGBT individuals, even those who have been victim-
ized, are often reluctant to bring the law into their homes.  One reason for this is that police often respond
differently when called to a same-sex domestic violence incident than when called to a different-sex do-
mestic violence incident.”).
84. See  Pamela M. Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered Homosexuals
Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1111 (2000) (“Opponents of pro-
tecting gays and lesbians under the domestic violence statutes reason that battered homosexuals are not
being denied equal protection because they have the option of pressing criminal charges.  This argument
fails to consider the differences in civil and criminal system and the benefits associated with civil protec-
tion orders.”).
85. See MILLER, supra note 72.
86. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a).
87. Id. § 240(1).
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treat the unrelated parent as a legal stranger, who must show extraordinary
circumstances, such as unfitness of the parent, before the courts will consider the
child’s best interest.88  Because the law affords few protections, survivors of do-
mestic violence who are not the legal parents of children may stay with their
abusive partners to maintain contact with the children.
New York courts have afforded no help to same-sex partners who have not
adopted the children of their partners.  In 1991, the Court of Appeals held that a
long-term same-sex partner who planned with the biological mother to conceive
children with the intent of raising the children together as a family did not have
a right to visitation unless the child was adopted.89  Another New York court has
since held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is also unavailable to a same-sex
partner seeking custody of a non-adopted child, and that parens patriae did not
provide a basis for granting standing to the former lesbian partner of the biologi-
cal mother of two siblings, one of whom the partner had adopted and the other
she had not yet adopted.90
Recently, the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, in Cannisi v.
Walsh , addressed the lack of legal protection for same-sex couples with children
in a separation agreement action.91  The Cannisi court used the best interests of
the child standard to determine how to distribute property in a dissolving part-
nership in which the partners were both parents of the child.92  The court pointed
88. In re Doe, 779 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Fam. Ct. Kings County 2004) (“[A legal] ‘stranger’ has standing [to seek
custody of a child] only if it is shown that the birth parent is unfit, or has abandoned the child, or that
similarly ‘extraordinary’ circumstances exist that permit the court to weigh custody in light of the child’s
best interests.”).
89. In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
90. In re C.M. v. C.H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004); see also In re Janis C. v. Christine
T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2d Dep’t 2002) (holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is unavailable to a
previous same-sex partner seeking visitation when the partner is neither the biological nor the adoptive
parent of the child); Multari v. Sorrell, 731 N.Y.S.2d 238 (3d Dep’t 2001) (dismissing the claim for
visitation of a former heterosexual partner of a child’s biological mother, because the former partner was
neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of the child).
91. No. 52075, slip op. at 1 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006).
92. Id. at 5 (“The Legislature has failed to create a mechanism to ensure the welfare of dependent children of
separating same sex couples.  Although the Legislature has yet to act, it is antithetical to public policy and
inconsistent with existing legislation to believe the Legislature intends that the interests of the minor
children of a same sex relationship should not be considered in dividing the assets of the couple.  Notwith-
standing the absence of a clear directive from the Legislature, the Court must fashion a remedy to deal
with the dispute before it.  In determining, what would be equitable in dividing the proceeds of the sale,
the respective roles the parties assumed in the relationship, as well as any understandings by the parties
regarding support of the children of the relationship must be considered.  It is appropriate and necessary in
determining how to divide the proceeds of the sale equitably, to take into consideration the intentions of
the parties in deciding to raise a family, in addition to the contributions made to this particular property.
The question at present, however, is not how the proceeds shall be divided; rather it is to decide whether
information regarding Plaintiff’s retirement account is relevant to determining how the proceeds should be
divided.  Broad discovery will provide the parties an opportunity to fully develop their arguments, ensur-
ing thorough consideration of all of the facts relevant to equitably distributing the proceeds.  This is espe-
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out the lack of a mechanism to protect children when dissolving the relationships
of their same-sex parents, and incorporated an analysis of the children’s needs to
determine how to distribute property equitably.93
D. Basic Economic Protections Available to LGBT Survivors of
Domestic Violence
Given the problems associated with obtaining civil orders of protection for
LGBT survivors and the attendant problems associated with using the criminal
system, safety planning often takes the form of increased financial assistance for
LGBT survivors of domestic violence.  In staying safe from domestic violence, it
is imperative that survivors have a means by which to develop economic self-
sufficiency.94  Survivors who are unable to meet basic economic needs, such as
housing and food, are often trapped in abusive relationships.  Survivors wishing
to safeguard joint assets may stay in abusive relationships rather than risk losing
assets that they have contributed to, but do not share title in.  Survivors may fear
losing their jobs if they take action to prevent the domestic violence either because
the abuser will “out” them at work or because engaging in the criminal justice
system is time-consuming and means time away from work.  New York State’s
Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act (“SONDA”)95 prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, education, and housing
accommodation.96  While SONDA is useful for individuals who can demonstrate
that their discrimination was based upon their sexual orientation, it does not
cially indicated where, the interests of two minor children are impacted and there is no undue prejudice to
either party.”).
93. Id.
94. See  Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Representing Domestic Violence Victims in the Work-
place, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 237 (Jill Laurie
Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
womeninthecourts/DV-Lawyers-Manual-Book.pdf; Pami Vyas, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence
in India: Economic Abuse and the Need for Broad Statutory Interpretations to Promote Women’s
Fundamental Rights, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 177 (2006); Margaret Graham Tebo, When Home
Comes to Work, 91 A.B.A. 42 (2005).
95. Executive, Civil Rights, Education—Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws
48 (McKinney).
96. Notably, SONDA does not protect transgender people from discrimination based on gender identity; how-
ever, if a trans person identifies as gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and is discriminated against because of sexual
orientation, and not because of gender identity, the discrimination would be prohibited under SONDA.
Many people argue that the “gender” and “sex” clauses in the New York State Human Rights Law protect
trans people from gender identity discrimination.  The New York City Administrative Code was recently
amended to more clearly and accurately reflect this intention in New York City. NEW YORK CITY
COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES REGARDING “GENDER IDENTITY” DISCRIMINATION, A
FORM OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,
available at http://www.srlp.org/documents/trans_guidelines_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2007) (pro-
viding guidelines interpreting the Human Rights Law that was passed in 2002 to protect the people of
New York City from discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression).
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protect them from discrimination based upon their status as “victims of domestic
violence.”97  Many of the laws that are designed to offer economic protection to
survivors of domestic violence include LGBT survivors; however, some, like eq-
uitable distribution of the assets of the partners, do not.
For survivors, meeting basic economic needs often means relying on public
assistance.  Under the New York City and New York State anti-discrimination
laws, LGBT public assistance recipients should be treated like any other public
recipient is treated.  Sexual orientation and gender identity have no effect on
eligibility for public assistance, and the Family Violence Option (also known as
the “domestic violence waiver”) is available to LGBT survivors.98  However,
prejudice and confusion about sexual orientation or gender identity issues make
getting public assistance and domestic violence protections difficult for LGBT
survivors.  Additionally, public assistance workers may not be educated about the
cultural differences in the LGBT communities, or about the dynamics unique to
domestic violence in these communities.  These workers may therefore make in-
correct assumptions about the abuse and the risks faced by survivors when deter-
mining waivers under the Family Violence Option.
For working survivors, maintaining job security is of paramount concern.99
New York does not provide its citizens who are experiencing domestic violence
with a large amount of employment-based protections.  New York State has a
penal provision that criminalizes retaliatory action taken against an employee
who must attend court proceedings in order to obtain an order of protection in
criminal or family court or who must participate in criminal proceedings.100
This law does not contain any limitations based upon family or matrimonial
status that would determine the entitlement to protection.  The New York City
Administrative Code also protects resident domestic violence survivors from dis-
crimination by employers.101  New York City resident survivors may also be eli-
gible for protections such as workplace accommodations,102 time off for court
97. See generally Weiser & Widiss, supra note 94; Vyas, supra note 94; Tebo supra note 94.
98. See  Amy E. Schwartz & Sharon Stapel, Public Assistance and Housing: Helping Survivors Navigate
Difficult Systems, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 255
(Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006), available at http://www.courts.state.
ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/DV-Lawyers-Manual-Book.pdf (providing a detailed discussion on the Fam-
ily Violence Option, and other public assistance considerations for domestic violence survivors).
99. See  Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution when Domestic
Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2006) (providing an in-depth survey of
remedies used to assist survivors of domestic violence in the employment setting); see also  Janet Mickish,
Domestic Violence: “Make it your Business” A Huge Success, 33 COLO. LAW. 49 (2004); Sandra S.
Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public Policy” Exception to Em-
ployment-at-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121 (2003).
100. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14 (McKinney 2007).
101. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.1(2) (McKinney 2007).
102. Id. § 8-107.1(3)(a).
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proceedings,103 short-term disability benefits, and unemployment insurance
benefits.104
E. Housing and Domestic Violence105
Many LGBT survivors of domestic violence, like other survivors, face
homelessness; however, homeless shelters, even domestic violence shelters, often do
not provide appropriate services for LGBT survivors.  Under the New York City
and New York State anti-discrimination laws, LGBT homeless people and subsi-
dized housing tenants should be treated in a non-discriminatory manner.  How-
ever, it is not considered discriminatory to refuse to shelter gay men in a shelter if
it is a single-sex unit for women because anti-discrimination laws specifically
allow for single-sex shelters.106  There are also specific problems for transgender
survivors who may be identified by shelter providers by their gender assigned at
birth, and therefore assigned to the single-sex shelters that do not correspond with
the survivors’ gender identity.  In New York City, the Department of Homeless
Services (“DHS”) has released a very helpful policy directive about sheltering
transgender clients in homeless shelters.107  The DHS policy states that “a client’s
gender is determined by his or her gender identity,” and gender identity shall be
determined by asking “the client how he or she identifies, irrespective of legal
documents or physical appearance.”108
All domestic violence survivors who are in imminent danger and have no
safe place to live are eligible for shelter regardless of sex, gender, immigration
status, family size, income, state, community, origin, or any other factor.  How-
ever, because of space restrictions or staffing limitations, some shelters limit the
number of beds available for large families, single people, men, residents with
older male children, or residents with disabilities.  Many domestic violence shel-
ters have sheltered lesbians for years, although not all shelters have a residential
service program that is geared toward same-sex domestic violence.109  Some do-
103. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14.
104. See  Weiser & Widiss, supra note 94 at 244–45.
105. For a discussion of other domestic violence related housing options, see Schwartz & Stapel, supra note 98.
106. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(5)(k) (“The provisions of this subdivision which prohibit distinc-
tions on the basis of gender and whether children are, may be or would be residing with a person shall not
apply to dormitory-type housing accommodations including, but not limited to, shelters for the homeless
where such distinctions are intended to recognize generally accepted values of personal modesty and pri-
vacy or to protect the health, safety or welfare of families with children.”).
107. N.Y. City Dep’t of Homeless Serv., Procedure No. 06-1-31 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.
transgenderlaw.org/resources/DHStransgenderpolicyfinal020206.pdf.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Although lesbians and bisexual women generally do not have trouble finding shelter space designated for
women, often the shelter is not equipped to address issues of sexual orientation or same-sex violence.  Gay
men, as all men do, have a more difficult time finding domestic violence shelters because many shelters
have dormitory style housing and therefore may be designated as single sex.  Transgender clients whose
birth certificates reflect their gender assigned at birth and not their gender identity, and transgender
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mestic violence shelters have specifically addressed sheltering gay men and lesbian
survivors of domestic violence.110  Notably, the New York State shelter regula-
tions do not require that shelter space go only to those who are born biologically
female; however, the vast majority of those in need of services have been female
survivors of heterosexual domestic violence.  As a result, most domestic violence
shelters do not have the physical space to serve individuals of different genders
within their existing structures.  Some domestic violence programs that have
more flexible space arrangements, or safe home networks, have the ability to
house gay male or transgender male residents.  However, most domestic violence
survivors, regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation, do not need resi-
dential domestic violence services, rather they need support and assistance from a
program’s non-residential services, such as advocacy, support, and counseling.
LGBT survivors of domestic violence report feeling re-victimized by the shelter
system, the shelter staff, and the other residents’ homophobic or transphobic be-
havior.111  This may be changing as the New York State Senate recently appro-
priated $400,000 to create the “ ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender domestic
violence fund’;” which will make “the moneys of the fund available to support the
development of community lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender domestic vio-
lence education and services.”112
F. Name Changes
Some survivors of domestic violence choose to change their names to evade
their partners’ attempts to find them.113  While there are provisions that are
well-established for name changes on behalf of victims of domestic violence and
stalking,114 transgender people have experienced, for some time, difficulty in
changing their names for any reason.  Initially, some courts, although not all,
prohibited name changes of transgender applicants absent proof of gender reas-
clients who do not “pass” as easily in their gender identity presentation (e.g., a “masculine” looking trans-
gender woman) are often denied shelter or are sheltered in an inappropriate single-sex shelter.  The most
commonly heard reason for turning trans women away from women-only DV shelters is that the other
shelter residents will not feel comfortable with a trans woman.  This is transphobia and must be addressed
through education and information to shelter staff and residents.
110. In New York City, Safe Horizon has a dedicated apartment for LGBT clients and, so far, has used it to
house gay, lesbian, and trans women.  Safe Horizon attorneys work closely with the New York City Anti-
Violence Project (“AVP”) and receive both LGBT referrals and on-going training from AVP.  As well,
shelters such as the Safe Homes Project and Help USA have worked to include LGBT populations in their
shelter systems.
111. DOLAN-SOTO & KAPLAN, supra note 3.
112. N.Y. State Assemb., A03378, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess., available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/
?bn=A03378.
113. Name changes based on same-sex relationship status are acceptable absent an intent to defraud or misrep-
resent. In re Daniels, 773 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2003).
114. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 64-a (McKinney 2007).
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signment surgery.115  This requirement was, for obvious reasons, omitted from
the analysis in non-transgender name changes.  This additional hurdle was irrel-
evant in name change applications and advocates suspected that the court was
suffering from a lack of understanding of, and bias against, transgender appli-
cants.  After vigorous advocacy, and education of the bench, the court reversed
that decision.  The court’s thoughtful decision found that the original decision was
based on ideas that were “misplaced, as they anticipate questions that simply are
not raised by this application.”116  Subsequent decisions have made explicit the
limitations of the court’s analysis in deciding name changes, and have specifically
held that public policy concerns should not be the focus of the decision making.117
Instead, absent an intent to defraud or to misrepresent, a transgender name
change should not be denied.118
G. Protection of Assets
Because the legal system does not provide many of the safety protections to
LGBT survivors that advocates generally rely upon when working with domes-
tic violence survivors, such as orders of protection and the myriad forms of relief
that accompany these orders, it is important to consider other legal remedies that
might be available to LGBT intimate partner violence survivors.  Contract and
transactional law can be of assistance in determining the rights and responsibili-
ties of each partner when dissolving a relationship.  An LGBT survivor of inti-
mate partner violence may be able to bring a breach of contract action.  The
Supreme Court in New York County held that even when a marriage would not
be recognized in New York, any express agreements made therein are to be recog-
nized.119  The court in this case did not focus on the legally defined relationships
between the parties, but instead considered the action of contracting, including
whether there was sufficient consideration, a meeting of the minds as to the es-
sential terms, and mutual promises, in addition to the “love and affection” ex-
pected in an intimate partnership.120  Generally, New York does not recognize an
115. In re Guido, 771 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2003) (“The court denied the application
‘without prejudice to renew with statement regarding marital status/children and proof, i.e., physician’s
affirmation, of the completion of the sex change operation.’ ”).
116. Id. at 791.
117. In re Daniels, 773 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223–24 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 2003) (“An application to change a
name is not to be decided based on public policy grounds, but on a much narrower basis.”).
118. Guido , 771 N.Y.S.2d 789.
119. Anonymous v. Anonymous, No. 50080, slip op. at 11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2004).
120. Id. at 6 (“The sole issue before this Court at this juncture . . . is whether the Agreement between plaintiff
and defendant is a valid and enforceable contract.  The relevant inquiry . . . thus becomes whether there
was sufficient consideration to support the Agreement, for this remains the pertinent test even though the
parties’ contemplation of cohabitation may have been the reason for their entering into such an agreement
at the outset.  Provided there is sufficient consideration, the issue next becomes whether there was a
meeting of the minds as to the essential terms. . . . Consideration is defined as some right, interest, profit
or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or
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implied contract for the rendition of services by unmarried couples living together
because courts assume that the relationships between the parties make the render-
ing of such services naturally gratuitous.121  However, in Moors v. Hall, the
Second Department suggested that an individual may be entitled to quantum
meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the domestic services rendered while
in an unmarried relationship.122  Generally, a major obstacle to recovery in
quantum meruit is the presumption that services rendered between members of
the same household have been performed gratuitously.123  Presumably, LGBT
partners could similarly sue for services rendered and face the same obstacles.  As
well, additional obstacles exist in enforcing contracts generally.  Oral contracts of
this type are unenforceable under the statute of frauds.124  Former domestic part-
ners in both straight and same-sex relationships have had much less success
bringing breach of contract claims against their former partners based on oral
promises of care and support.125
undertaken by the other. It is not essential to the validity of a contract that the consideration be recited
therein since it may be implied, or proved by parol evidence. Mutual promises in each of which the
promisor undertakes some act or forbearance that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the prom-
isor or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of which is void, are sufficient consideration for one another
in a bilateral contract. However, ‘love and affection,’ does not suffice as a predicate for enforcement of an
executory agreement.”) (citations omitted).
121. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 486 (1980) (“New York courts have long accepted the concept that an
express agreement between unmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not
living together provided only that illicit sexual relations were not ‘part of the consideration of the con-
tract.’ The theory . . . is that while cohabitation without marriage does not give rise to the property and
financial rights which normally attend the marital relation, neither does cohabitation disable the parties
from making an agreement within the normal rules of contract law.”) (citations omitted).
122. 532 N.Y.S.2d 412 (2d Dep’t 1988).  It is important to note that in Moors , the couple maintained separate
residences and the male partner acknowledged on several occasions that he would pay his female partner
for the services rendered. Id.
123. 95 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 1 § 13 (2007).
124. Robin v. Cook, 204 N.Y.L.J. 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990); see also Plaza v. Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d
446 (1st Dep’t 1995) (holding that the evidence of the plaintiff, the former partner to a same-sex domestic
partnership, was insufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim because any oral agreement is barred by the
statute of frauds).
125. In some cases, the outcome has been rather severe. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. O’Reilly, No. 51297 (Sup. Ct.
Rockland County 2005).  In O’Reilly, the plaintiff was married for a number of years and produced two
children with her husband, a mentally disabled man. Id. at 1.  During the marriage, the husband’s
mother provided the family with a home and financial support. Id.  The plaintiff claimed that her
mother-in-law promised that she would continue to provide housing and financial support to the family if
the plaintiff would be a stay-at-home wife and mother. Id.  The plaintiff alleged that she gave up
educational and employment opportunities in detrimental reliance on this promise. Id.  Upon the death of
her son, however, the mother-in-law ceased providing support to the plaintiff and began eviction proceed-
ings against her and her children. Id. at 2.  The plaintiff sued her mother-in-law for breach of contract,
and argued that the oral promises should be exempt from the statute of frauds based on the equitable
theories of promissory estoppel and partial performance. Id. at 2–3.  The O’Reilly court, while sympa-
thetic to the plaintiff’s position, found that her claims failed as a matter of law under the statute of frauds
and that she did not satisfy the equitable theories of partial performance. Id. at 5.
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Same-sex partners may also be able to invoke the laws of partnership.126
The law of partnership and joint ventures has been used as an avenue for legal
and equitable relief by and among non-marital cohabitants, and thus, appears to
be immediately applicable to a party who was formerly in a gay or lesbian rela-
tionship.127  In determining whether the laws of partnership are appropriate,
courts look at whether the parties had so joined their property, interests, skills,
and risks so that contributions have become one, and the interests of the parties
have been made subject to each of the parties.128  Such a partnership need not
have been agreed to in writing.129  The fact that there is no written agreement is
merely one element to consider in determining whether a partnership existed.130
A court will look at the relevant testimony, conduct, and documentary evi-
dence.131  Even though a partnership or joint venture theory of recovery is one
avenue for recovery that should be explored, it has several built-in evidentiary
obstacles, tying the victim-plaintiff’s recovery to his or her ability to establish that
an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and the former partner.132
LGBT survivors of abuse may have problems overcoming these evidentiary hur-
126. See, e.g., Cytron v. Malinowitz, No. 51555 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2003) (determining that a domestic
partner seeking a portion of the proceeds from the sale of a jointly-owned property in a partition action
could be determined by the laws of partnership).
127. The leading case governing unmarried, cohabiting parties in New York is Morone v. Morone, in which
the New York Court of Appeals held that express contracts between unmarried cohabitants will generally
be enforced, particularly when the contract involves the distribution of assets and income between the
parties.  50 N.Y.2d 481 (1980).  The court in Morone  relied, in part, upon a decision by the California
Supreme Court. Id.  The California Supreme Court held, in Marvin v. Marvin, that even in the absence
of an express contract, relief by and among unmarried cohabitants may be fashioned through the finding of
an implied contract, or even through such assorted doctrines as constructive trust, partnership, and joint
venture.  557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).  However, the New York Court of Appeals did not find Marvin to be
altogether persuasive, and refused to imply a partnership agreement between two unmarried cohabitants
when the relationship of the parties was such that the services rendered between them would be considered
gratuitous. Morone , 50 N.Y.2d at 488.
128. Hanlon v. Melfi, 423 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1979).  However, an essential element to
forming a partnership is a mutual understanding or promise between the parties to combine their money,
labor, efforts, and skills so that they can share in the profits of a business purpose or goal. Id. at 134.
Joint ventures are similar to partnerships, except that a contract or a voluntary agreement between the
parties is required in the latter. Id.  In addition, unlike partnerships, joint ventures are limited in time
and purpose. Id.
129. See  Trombley v. Sorrelle, 786 N.Y.S.2d 296 (City Ct. City of Watertown 2004) (dismissing the claim on
procedural grounds, but recognizing that unmarried cohabitants may seek relief by first establishing that a
partnership existed between the parties).
130. See id.; Cytron, No. 51555, slip op. at 2.
131. Hanlon, 423 N.Y.S.2d 132.
132. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Somers, 41 N.Y.2d 858 (1977) (determining that an oral agreement between
two unmarried cohabitants, whereby one party agreed to “take care of” the plaintiff if the plaintiff per-
formed certain domestic services, was too ambiguous to support any recovery under a partnership theory);
Cytron, No. 51555, slip op. at 1 (noting that evidence of a “loving and committed” domestic relationship
between the men constituted an insufficient evidentiary ground to establish whether a partnership or a
joint venture could exist).
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dles, particularly in instances where swift and expedient relief is sought, and the
party seeking relief has limited amounts of evidence available to establish an
economic measure of recovery.133
The theory of constructive trust may also protect same-sex relationships.  A
court may impose a constructive trust as to property to prevent one party from
being unjustly enriched.134  Generally, such a trust may be imposed upon a show-
ing of four elements: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise or
agreement, express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance on such promise or agree-
ment, and (4) unjust enrichment.  It is important to note that a constructive trust
may be imposed based on a confidential relationship, which can grow out of a
marital or other family relationship, such as an LGBT domestic partnership.
Thus, the Supreme Court in New York County, in Minieri v. Knittel, indicated
that a constructive trust might be appropriate because one party to a lesbian
couple transferred nominal and joint title to her real and personal assets to her
partner in reliance on an oral agreement between them that it was being held for
the transferor and would be conveyed to the transferor upon request.135  Impor-
tantly, in Minieri, the court also noted that the above enumerated factors are not
necessarily determinative of the imposition of a constructive trust.136  The Third
Department, in Lester v. Zimmer,137 held that the third element of a construc-
tive trust, a transfer in reliance on a promise, may be demonstrated by such
things as contributions of money, time, and effort by a domestic partner in reli-
ance on a promise to share the results of their joint efforts.  This remedy is partic-
ularly important to survivors of domestic violence who have experienced
economic abuse which is often characterized by a lack of ownership of money or
property in the relationship.
Same-sex survivors may also invoke protection under a conversion theory.
Conversion is defined as an act or series of acts of willful interference, without
133. Although non-existence of a formal partnership agreement has not thwarted the success of partnership
arguments by cohabiting parties per se, the existence of a written agreement has resulted in the granting
of summary judgment relief to former gay and lesbian partners who sought to enforce the remedial equi-
ties of the partnership. See  Carnuccio v. Upton, 790 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1st Dep’t 2005) (holding that a
written domestic partnership agreement was supported by sufficient consideration when one agreed to
provide financial consideration and the other to renovate and maintain the property which had been
purchased jointly).
134. Artache v. Goldin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 702 (2d Dep’t 1987).
135. 727 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2001) (deciding a case in which former lesbian partners sued one
another for a variety of claims relating to property and other economic items that they shared during their
three-year relationship, including joint checking, money market, and investment accounts to which they
both contributed).
136. Specifically, when deciding summary judgment on the plaintiff’s constructive trust claim, the Minieri
court found that satisfaction of the confidential or fiduciary relationship factor was “undisputed.” Id. at
874.  As to the other factors, the Minieri court held that there were questions of fact relating to the
promises and transfers made, and to whether the defendant had been unjustly enriched. Id. at 875.
137. 542 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dep’t 1989).
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lawful justification, with an item of property in a manner inconsistent with an-
other’s right, whereby such person is deprived of the use and possession of the
property.138  Thus, it would include such acts as taking possession of a partner’s
property, refusing to relinquish a partner’s property, disposing of the goods of a
partner to a third person, or destroying a partner’s property.139  This could be an
important remedy for LGBT survivors who cannot access family or county su-
preme courts to obtain orders directing the abusers to return the property.
Survivors may also wish to bring an action under a replevin theory.  Re-
plevin constitutes an action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully
taken or detained by the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and
holds the property until the court decides who owns it.140  Generally, replevin is
applicable only when the property or thing is capable of specific identification or
certain designation.141  Replevin may be employed to permit the recovery of a
wide variety of tangible goods.  Although rarely used, replevin may be a power-
ful weapon when an abuser wrongly holds property belonging to the victim.
Because intimate partner violence in many LGBT relationships may not be
remedied in family court or in county supreme courts, LGBT survivors may con-
sider civil tort remedies.  These torts could include assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, defamation, or public disclo-
sure of private facts.142  Survivors may also consider using small claims courts to
recover certain assets.143  Although LGBT survivors will likely be unsuccessful in
invoking legal protection because of the lack of a legally recognized definition of
their relationships, using incident-based legal actions for similar remedies may
provide necessary relief.  Courts have recognized a right to use these theories of
law despite Hernandez and the lack of access to marriage by same-sex couples.144
138. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 356–57 (8th ed. 2004).
139. See, e.g., Tucker v. Evanczik, 435 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep’t 1980) (determining that by the act of fraud-
ulently signing a partner’s name on a vehicle registration and then selling the vehicle to a third party
constituted conversion).
140. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 1325–26.
141. Salatino v. Salatino, 786 N.Y.S.2d 570 (2d Dep’t 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7102 (2007).
142. For a discussion of the utilization, or lack thereof, of tort law to address domestic violence claims, see
Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation
Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945 (2004); and Betty Levinson, Domestic
Violence and Tort Remedies, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE
VICTIM 297 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006), available at http://www.
courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/DV-Lawyers-Manual-Book.pdf.
143. A person may go to small claims court to recover money for damages or property taken by an abusive
partner up to a value of five thousand dollars.  The small claims court is a simple, inexpensive, and
informal court where people can sue pro se.
144. See, e.g., Cannisi v. Walsh, 831 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006) (“[T]he holding [in Her-
nandez v. Robles] does not negate the existence of same sex relationships, nor the reality that some same
sex relationships dissolve, and the courts are called upon [to] resolve disputes regarding the distribution of
assets of such relationships.”).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF USING MULTIPLE LAWS AND FORUMS TO PROTECT LGBT
SURVIVORS
For domestic violence survivors with legally recognized relationships with
their partners, such as marriage or children in common, there are laws that allow
the use of a single forum for multiple remedies.  In the matrimonial proceedings
of divorce, separation, and annulment, survivors may incorporate actions that
include relief such as orders of protection, custody, child support, maintenance,
equitable distribution of assets, and exclusive possession of the marital home.145
For survivors with children in common with non-spouse partners, family courts
can address, in one forum, issues such as orders of protection, custody, child sup-
port, and exclusive possession of the home.146  The Integrated Domestic Violence
Courts (“IDVC”), a new initiative working under a “one family, one judge”
model, allows New York courts to address issues in criminal, supreme, and family
courts in one forum.147  These courts are an initiative of the chief judge to address
the lack of a coordinated response to domestic violence in New York State.148  The
IDVC staff is trained on issues specific to domestic violence and has access to a
richer resource base for referrals than other court staff, including specialized court
staff.  The IDVC has become a model response to domestic violence in New York.
The IDVC was created specifically to address the often conflicting and confusing
array of court dates in different forums and before different judges that survivors
of domestic violence face in New York.149  This model was specifically introduced
to avoid a fractured approach to addressing domestic violence.  The IDVC allows
all actions typically heard in the family, supreme, and criminal courts to be heard
in one forum before one judge.  Because most LGBT survivors cannot obtain
relief in county supreme courts or family courts, the intervention of the IDVC
court structure is wholly denied to this population.
As is clear from the discussion above, traditional legal remedies, including
single forum remedies, are largely unavailable to LGBT survivors in theory and
in practice.  To protect LGBT survivors, it is often necessary to take a piecemeal
approach to civil legal remedies.150  This approach is not ideal as survivors are
already dealing with the emotional, physical, and economic effects of having abu-
sive intimate partners, and may not have the wherewithal to develop the myriad
strategies necessary to fully protect their rights.
145. See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236 pt. B, 240 (2007).
146. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT arts. 4, 6 & 8 (2007).
147. Integrated Domestic Violence Courts are an initiative by Chief Judge Judith Kaye.
148. See  Judith S. Kaye, Albany Law Review Symposium: Refinement or Reinvention, the State of Re-
form in New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831 (2006).
149. See JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY (2001), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
admin/stateofjudiciary/soj2001.pdf.
150. Ryiah Lilith, Reconsidering the Abuse that Dare not Speak its Name: A Criticism of Recent Legal
Scholarship Regarding Same-Gender Domestic Violence, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 181 (2001).
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This piecemeal approach is neither efficient nor effective for LGBT survi-
vors.  The use of judicial resources in multiple forums for multiple claims result-
ing from the same incident and factual circumstances is also inefficient for the
judiciary.  The need to appeal to multiple courts for various remedies is inconve-
nient at best, and is often prohibitively time consuming and expensive for any
litigant.  For survivors of domestic violence, this multiple forum structure may
exact an emotional or financial toll that further limits survivors’ abilities to liti-
gate.  Having multiple cases in various forums and before different judges makes
it more likely that a survivor will abandon a particular action or present a par-
tial, and therefore weakened, case.
To address the failures of a piecemeal approach, some legal theorists en-
courage legal recognition of LGBT relationships through marriage, civil unions,
or domestic partnerships as a way to coordinate the legal response to domestic
violence in LGBT partnerships.151  It is unlikely that New York State, after the
recent Court of Appeals decision in Hernandez,152 will recognize the right to
marriage or civil unions for same-sex couples in the immediate future.  Although
the majority in Hernandez suggested that the New York State Legislature could
address this problem through new legislation, it also provided several reasons
why the legislature might choose not to do so.153  With this explicit direction from
the New York Court of Appeals, it is unlikely that the New York State Legisla-
ture will provide for statewide legal recognition of LGBT relationships in the
near future.154
It is also unlikely that New York State will expand the class of litigants who
have standing in family court.  Although such a bill has been proposed in the
151. Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Vio-
lence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Responses, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 251 (1994).
152. 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
153. Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 358–59 (“The question is not, we emphasize, whether the Legislature must or
should continue to limit marriage in this way; of course the Legislature may (subject to the effect of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act) extend marriage or some or all of its benefits to same-sex couples.  We
conclude, however, that there are at least two grounds that rationally support the limitation on marriage
that the Legislature has enacted.  First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-
sex relationships. . . .  There is a second reason: The Legislature could rationally believe that it is better,
other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father.”) (citations omitted).
154. Some scholars have discussed an equal protection challenge as a route to legalizing LGBT relationships.
There may be a de facto discrimination challenge to the current Family Court Act and Domestic Relations
Law regarding relationships conferring standing upon litigants.  It is unclear from published cases invok-
ing the Family Court Act, whether the statute does not apply to LGBT couples who meet the statutory
definition or whether the cases are simply not reported.  Any potential challenge in New York is weakened
by the idea that many heterosexual couples are also precluded from invoking relief under the Family Court
Act or the Domestic Relations Law. See  Murphy, supra note 49; Mac D. Hunter, Homosexuals as a
New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects Under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence
Act of 1991, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 557 (1992–1993).
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New York State Assembly and Senate for nineteen years, it has yet to be passed
by the Senate.155  The bill would expand the definition of family and household
members from those married, formerly married, related by blood, or who have
children in common156 to include “unrelated persons who continually or at regu-
lar intervals reside in the same household or have done so in the past, and persons
who are or have been in a dating or intimate relationship whether or not they
have ever lived together.”157  This new law would provide civil remedies to an
expanded class of intimate partners.158  Given that in the past nearly two de-
cades, this bill and other versions of it, did not pass in the Senate, it is unlikely
that this relationship-defined protection will expand to include LGBT survivors.
Without the right to marriage or a marriage-like relationship status, LGBT
survivors and anti-violence advocates may use the myriad remedies discussed in
this article.  However, a more efficient, long-term solution may be to develop a
different analysis of legislation that will protect LGBT survivors.  Such legisla-
tion would make explicit that LGBT survivors are protected and would move
from a relationship-focused provision of remedies to an incident-focused provi-
sion of remedies.  The law would address the incidence of domestic violence and
provide civil remedies that would protect survivors physically and economically
regardless of any legally recognized relationship between the parties.  Such a law
would not require a legally recognized relationship between the parties, and it
would provide for various civil remedies in one forum, such as a trial court.159
It is important that legislation that is aimed at protecting survivors of do-
mestic violence specifically include LGBT survivors.  Without explicit inclusion,
it is likely that the obstacles to enforcing LGBT survivors’ rights, such as
homophobia within the legal system and reluctance of LGBT survivors to iden-
155. See  A. 6060, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 1835, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2007). These bills propose to expand the definition of “members of the same family or household,” for
purposes of issuance of orders of protection and temporary orders of protection and the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of family courts and criminal courts, to include: a former spouse whether or not living together,
unrelated persons who continually or at regular intervals reside in the same household or have done so in
the past, and persons who are or have been in a dating or intimate relationship whether or not they have
ever lived together.  In the 2007 Legislative Session, the New York State Assembly has also introduced a
bill that would expand access to family court to a “third party acting with malice on behalf of a defendant”
to be included under the temporary order of protection conditions and by adding unrelated persons who
have been intimate or in a dating relationship with the victim under the definition of “members of the
same family or household.”  A. 4555, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
156. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1).
157. See  A. 6060, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 1835, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2007).
158. See generally Sarah E. Warne, Note, Rocks, Hard Places, and Unconventional Domestic Violence
Victims: Expanding Availability of Civil Orders of Protection in New York, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
279 (2007/08) (discussing the need to expand the availability of civil orders of protection to LGBT survi-
vors of domestic violence).
159. Such legislation may be proposed by the New York City Council; however, at the time of this article, no
such legislation had been introduced.
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tify domestic violence in their relationships will remain.160  New York City has
proposed legislation that would allow registered domestic partners, both same-sex
and opposite-sex, to invoke protections related to bereavement leave, visitation in
correctional facilities, visitation in hospitals, eligibility for housing as family
members, which confers more protection than non-family members, and health
benefits.161  This bill focuses on the legal recognition of the partnerships and con-
fers rights to New York City residents who enter into domestic partnerships.
Although these protections do not focus specifically on domestic violence, it is con-
ceivable that survivors could use this legal status to obtain protections from do-
mestic violence by their partners, such as housing stability.  However, this law
falls short of the economic protections that are often most pivotal to survivors in
leaving violent relationships.  As well, a relationship-focused standing require-
ment omits LGBT survivors who have not entered into formal relationships
with their partners.
Focusing on the legally recognized relationship definition may well serve
many LGBT couples who have traditionally been underserved and under-
represented in the legal and political process due to the inaccurate perceptions of
their relationships as transitory.162  There is no doubt that conferring legal status
upon a relationship brings with it attendant benefits and legitimizations, both
socially and legally.  However, it is ill-advised to conceive of domestic violence
protections as derivative of marriage or a marriage-like relationship, even if
such status existed in New York State for LGBT partners.  To encourage survi-
vors of domestic violence to formalize their relationships so as to avail themselves
of relief from the domestic violence further mires those survivors in relationships
from which they wish to escape.  While the formalization of relationships can
provide structure and certain remedies upon the dissolution of the relationship,
the dissolution itself may create more difficulties emotionally, financially, and
legally in escaping domestic violence.
If formalizing relationships will not adequately protect LGBT survivors,
the shift in analysis must focus on incident- and remedies-based legislation.  Any
law that confers protection based on a legally defined relationship, by definition,
omits classes of people.  Legislation that focuses on the legally recognized status of
the relationship between the parties does not effectively address violence exper-
ienced by those in LGBT relationships in New York.  Instead, we should consider
laws that address the underlying acts, as the Penal Code does, but that also allow
civil remedies.  As discussed above, civil remedies may be invoked more readily
by survivors of domestic violence who want to escape the violence, but may not
160. Mary Beth D. Collins, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Addressing the Issues for the Proper Protec-
tion of Victims, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 99 (2002).
161. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-244 (2006).
162. See  Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1841,
1880 (2006).
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want to engage the criminal justice system.  The argument that criminal proceed-
ings protect LGBT survivors fails on two counts.  First, the criminal justice sys-
tem, which penalties include incarceration, may deter LGBT survivors from
invoking this protection because they are worried about the safety of their part-
ners in entering a homophobic criminal justice system,163 and their own safety
when prosecution results in little or no jail time.  Second, the criminal justice
system cannot provide, as a long-term solution, the economic relief that is so nec-
essary to survivors’ continued safety.  Instead, using the Penal Code’s incident-
focused model, wherein the parties’ relationship status is not determinative of the
relief granted, we should develop civil legislation that addresses the incident of
domestic violence with attendant civil relief.
An incident-focused model of legislation would allow courts to disentangle
the relationship of the parties from the relief requested.  Disentanglement theory
seeks to separate the legal status of a relationship from the privileges that a law
confers, and uses a “functional approach” to identify litigants who can invoke
legal protections.164  Using a disentanglement theory, legislation in New York
would focus on the acts of domestic violence and incorporate remedies that address
safety and economic issues.  For example, a civil law that recognizes the act of
domestic violence as conferring jurisdiction to the court over the parties, regard-
less of their relationship to each other, could provide for orders of protection,
distribution of assets, and settlement of housing issues all in one forum.  The shift
in analysis would allow litigants, who can prove that an act of domestic violence
occurred, to invoke protections that recognize the intimate nature of their rela-
tionship without explicitly defining this relationship.
Such a law would incorporate the family offenses that are recognized by the
Family Court Act165 without the attendant definition of family or household
member.166  Like transactional law, the civil remedies would be based on the
interactions between the parties, which would therefore define their relationship
to each other.  The law would allow for civil remedies such as orders of protec-
tion, exclusive possession of a shared home, and distribution of shared financial
assets.167  This incident-based concept of law is not foreign to our legal system; it
is in large part the basis of contract law, law in equity, small claims court proce-
dures, and other transactional theories.  It is anticipated that the intimate nature
163. Id. at 1880 (“There is reason to believe that fear of a homophobic reaction may cause some individuals in
same-sex relationships not to seek legal recourse from domestic violence.”).
164. For a discussion of disentangling of marriage-like status and domestic violence relief, see id. at 1844
(“The legal system defines who gets privileges and benefits by discerning who is married or most like a
married person rather than by asking who should receive these benefits based on the purpose of such
benefits.”).
165. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1).
166. Id.
167. Custody and visitation would not need to be addressed by this law, as litigants with a legally recognized
relationship to common children would be able to invoke the Family Court Act. Id.
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of the relationship and of domestic violence, as different from stranger violence,
will be a cause of some concern in legal, social, and political circles.  However, the
intimate nature of a relationship, or lack thereof, is a subjective judgment to
make in the first place.  For example, a woman who has a child by a man she met
only once at a holiday party would have access to family court to obtain an order
of protection because of the impregnation, yet a same-sex survivor of a multi-
decade relationship that resulted in no children in common would not.  These
examples demonstrate the unintentional absurdity in defining intimacy.168
It may also be necessary, in this political and legal climate, to concentrate
efforts on educating practitioners about the issues specific to LGBT intimate
partner violence and to begin regular use of the above discussed non-traditional
methods.  This route, along with judicial education and collaborative practice
models, such as sharing information, model papers, and universal training
throughout the state for attorneys, will eventually sensitize the judiciary to these
issues and allow practitioners to begin to approach these protections for LGBT
survivors in an informed manner.  It may also allow LGBT survivors to make
informed legal and strategic decisions based on consistent practice and, it is hoped,
outcomes.
V. CONCLUSION
As the LGBT communities and their allies struggle to obtain legal recogni-
tion and protections for themselves, their partners, and their children, these com-
munities are also confronting intimate partner violence.  Anti-violence service
providers must be aware of, and educated about, issues specific to the LGBT
communities, and they must be willing to work in coalition with LGBT organi-
zations to address LGBT intimate partner violence.  New  York laws that recog-
nize LGBT relationships while offering civil legal protections against domestic
violence are an ideal solution, but an impractical reality in light of Hernandez.
In one recent case, the Supreme Court in New York County imposed the
equivalent of equitable distribution factors169 in a partition action170 suggesting
that, if read with Cannisi, courts are struggling to find a way to offer legal
recognition to same-sex relationships.  However, these cases have yet to reach the
New York Court of Appeals.  Until the legislature directly addresses the legiti-
macy of LGBT intimate partnerships, whether through marriage, civil unions,
168. Because there are clear public policy reasons for different protections for victims with children in common
with their batterers, I do not suggest here that this should change.  I do, however, suggest that this is one
way in which the Family Court Act measures the “intimacy” of a relationship when providing relief that
may not involve the child at all—such as an order of protection.  Under the circumstance, it seems unnec-
essary to restrict access to a non-child-related protection to litigants simply because they do not have
children in common.
169. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 pt. B(5)(d).
170. C.Y. v. H.C., 237 N.Y.L.J. 22 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2007).
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or a state-wide domestic partnership scheme, we are left with a piecemeal ap-
proach in which LGBT survivors in some courts or counties may be more fortu-
nate than those in others.  Instead of this piecemeal approach, we should turn to
incident-focused legislation to provide civil remedies, including economic protec-
tions, to survivors of LGBT domestic violence.
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